Falhas de Governo: Por Que Países Subdesenvolvidos Não Conseguem Construir Bombas Atômicas?

Uma das verdades cruciais da economia é que governos geralmente falham naquilo que fazem. Portanto, não surpreende que governos falhem frequentemente quando são responsáveis pela oferta de bens públicos como defesa. O caso da construção e gerência das armas atômicas é bem conhecido como comenta Jacques E. C. Hymans, neste artigo na Foreign Affairs: "most rulers of recent would-be nuclear states have tended to rely on a coercive, authoritarian management approach to advance their quest for the bomb, using appeals to scientists' greed and fear as the primary motivators. That coercive approach is a major mistake, because it produces a sense of alienation in the workers by removing their sense of professionalism. As a result, nuclear programs lose their way. Moreover, underneath these bad management choices lie bad management cultures. In developing states with inadequate civil service protections, every decision tends to become politicized, and state bureaucrats quickly learn to keep their heads down. Not even the highly technical matters faced by nuclear scientific and technical workers are safe from meddling politicians. The result is precisely the reverse of what the politicians intend: not heightened efficiency but rather a mixture of bureaucratic sloth, corruption, and endless blame shifting".